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"A Communications Model o·f Cultu.re Conta~t 11 
James A. Yost 
* 
Most anthropologists currently involved in the study of culture contact 
recognize the importance of adequate communication for eu.cc.essful transmission 
of ideas or traits. S'01De, such as N~ehoff, have made el!{Jli.cit the importance 
they feel it has: "Communication by the innovator is probably the single most 
important kind of action in which he will engage, since it is a prerequisite 
for everythiflg else that follows. No ideas or techniques can be transferred 
from one person to another unless there are channel~ of co111111Unication estab-
lished to transfer them, and these are the patterns of CODIDlunication. If no 
adequate patterns of communication are established, the other innovator tech-
niques cannot take place. (Niehoff, 1966:15). However, few investigators con-
centrate upon the foEmal properties of communication itself when dealing with 
cross-cultural contact situations. Much, of course, has been done by social 
psychologists dealing with communication at an intra-cultural level, but few 
studies follow the pattern established by Eisenstadt (1952) in dealing with 
communication at an inter-cultural level 
The format of tnis paper will be to briefly note possible definitions of 
communication, to note some proposed models of communic.ati..on and, finally, 
to attempt to determine if these models are approp~iate for the cross-cultural 
contact situation. 
DEFINITION OF COMMUNICATION 
It seems to be generally accepted that communication involves the 




little agreement. Some would restrict the definition to involve communi-
cation between people only, others ~ould in~lude machines and animals, and 
still others would include revelation as communication (Newman, 1960:61). 
For some, notably psychologists, communication is the response of an organism 
to a stimulus (IBID:60). Cherry (1957:7) objects to the latter, noting that 
it is not the response itself that is communication, but rather the relation-
ship between the stimulus and the response. The latter seems to be what 
Weaver (1949:15) was saying when he noted that communication includes "all 
of the PROCEDURES by which one mind can affect anothe·r-." (italics mine) For 
purposes of this paper the theoretical discussion centered around the def-
inition may be side-stepped for the most part and a definition accepted that 
focuses upon the process involved when one system, the source, influences 
another, the destination, by manipulation of signals. When models are dis-
cussed, the further distinction will be made between communication in gen-
eral and human communi-c·ation. 
COMMUNICATIONS MODELS 
The minimal system of communication as outlined by Shannon and Weaver 
in 1949 in The itathea:atical Theory of Communication has been applied to the 
transmission of information in electrical, biological, psychological, social 
and linguistic systems. It is an explanation of communication in general in-
volving an infonnation souTce (see figure 1) which selects a message and, 
by means of a transmitter, converts the message into a signal. The signal is 
then sent over a channel to a receiver which converts the signal back into 
the original message and sends it to the destination. The process by which 
message is converted into a signal is called encoding. The reverse process 
by which the signal is converted back into the message is referred to as 
decoding. The code, according to Berlo (1960:30), is simply a systematic 
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set of symbols, or arbitrary relationships of form to meaning. Encoding, 
then becomes a matter of selecting the proper form to represent a given 
meanins. 1 It also involves relating these form-meaning composites to each 
other in a sequence according to prescribed rules (syntactic rules). The 
rules themselves convey meaning, so that the selection of the proper rule 
aids in getting a message across. For example, there is a syntactic rule in 
English that says the subject comes first in a declarative transitive clause, 
the verb next and the object last. Thus, to say 0 Bill hit it indicates 
that Bill (a form-meaning composite representing a male homo sapiens) is the 
actor. Gleason's description (1964:4) of language as a code having three 
kinds of components is useful here: inventories, sets of units out of which 
structures can be built; tactic rules, specification of ways in which units 
can be used to build structures; and recoding rules, specifications of the 
relations which obtain between co-occurrent superimposed structures. 
In transmitting the signal over the channel certain variations in the 
signal not intended by the source occur; anything which causes these unintended 
variations is referred to as noise (Weaver, 1949:17). 
sign~ receive! signal 
information source--ftransmitter-~channel~receiver~estination 
T 
noise source J 
FIGURE 1 (from Weaver, 1949) 
In communications theory the term information has a restric~ed meant·ng 
in that it is that which "P.rOV.~d.es the receiver with the ability to select 
from a bounded repertoire. Complete information would supply the minimal 
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coded instruction to allow the receiver to select uniquely and unambiguously, 
whereas redundant information would provide an excess of coded instructions 
for the same selection 01eier, 1962:125). This principle of redundancy is 
very important to communication in that the more redundancy there is, the 
more tolerance there is for noise (Rapoport, 1953:51). For example, I have 
often observed people listening to a radio while driving a tractor or boat 
or while pushing a lawnmower. Obviously these people miss many of the seg-
mental phonemes uttered over the radio, but due to redundancy, or context, 
they are able to grasp the meaning or message of the radio program. 
Shannon and Weaver's model is unilinear, consisting of a source and a 
destination, a beginning and an end. However, if the principle or feedback 
is added to this model, it becomes circular - i.e. messages received can 
affect messages sent. Just as redundancy is the repetition of a signal to 
overcome noise, negative feedback may be regarded as another error-correcting 
mechanism to overcome noise (Smith, 1966:365). Assuming that noise alters 
the signal so that the intended message is not the message received, the 
response of the destination will be different than "7hat is expected II of 
it by the source. This unexpected response acts as negative feedback to the 
source, causing it to emit another message in an attempt to overcome the 
error (see Wiener, 1948). If the etror is overcome and the destination re-
sponds as expected, this response acts es positive feedback to the source 
which may either send new messages or discontinue messages. 
Sebeok (1963:52) and Osgood and Sebeok (1965:1) note that Shannon and 
Weaver's model is not intended as a blueprint for human communication and, 
consequently, omits two very important factors. The first of these is the 
fact that the individual speaker functions as both source and destination 
SIL-UND Workpapers 1973
110. 
simultaneously, generally decoding those signals he transmits through 
various feedback mechanisms (hence, the corrections we make when we get our 
tongue tangledn). Each individual is a self-contained communication system, 
encompassing in his nervous apparatus ••• all of the components found in 
Shannon's model. (Osgood and Sebeok~l) The model they propose is show in 
figure 2 and described as follows (P.2): 'Translating into traditional psy-
chological language, INPUT becomes equivalent to 'stimulus', RECEIVER becomes 
'reception' and 'perception', DESTINATION and SOURCE become 'cognition' 
(meanitlg, attitude and the like), TRANSMITTER becomes 'motor organization 
and sequencing' , and OUTPUT becomes 'response'. ,,2 
cot.m1unication unit 
input~receiver-~>destination-;;,source--)-transmitter--}t)utput 
~decoding~~-~· ~ \-encoding-----,.,. 
FIGURE 2 (Osgood and Sebeok:2) 
The second factor Osgood anti Sebeok feel is not accounted for in the 
engineering model is the meaning of signals, that is 11their significance 
when vier,1ed' from the decoding side and their intention when viewed from Jthe 
encoding side. The research generated by such models has dealt almost 
exclusively with relations between transmitter and receiver ••• " (p.2). Else-
where Sebeok (1963:52) has attempted to incorporate meaning into a model 
based upon one by K. Buhler in which the source and destination are mutbally 
oriented toward a referent (Buhler's model is shown in figure 3). 
source ~ destination 




The main burden of most messages is this orientation toward the referent -
i.e. orienting the actor and addressee toward the referent in similar ways. 
Put in the words of Berlo (1960:16), the purpose of communication is the 
elicitation of a given response from a given person or group of persons -
that is1, getting others to understand things as the sender understands 
them. 
A,nother trait of the human model that must be accounted for, but is 
ignored.~y most, is the ability qf the receiver to tune in or drop out -
i.e •. to. shiftrJ!liS focus of attention, closing the channel a11d ending 
communication. Schramm (1963: 10) and rteier (1962.: 12) note that each of 
us is surrounded by many more messages than we can possibly receive. 
Therefore, we must be selective; our choice of messages to be received 
is dependent upon availability of the mess.age and rewards promised by it. 
If the message can be heard or seen at almost any time of day (eg. 
advertising on radio, television or billboards) its likelihood of being 
received is great. Likewise if it is in line with our present interests, 
we are more likely to pay attention to it. This is the first hurdle in 
communication. Once the message has gotten past this hurdle (i.e. selec-
tion) it must then be either accept~d or rejected. This process ls a matter 
of cogniti6n, which will be discussed at more length later. 
In all of the above no mention has been made of the kinds of channels 
and codes available to man for communication. The most obvious, of course, 
is speech~ but it is only one of a number of different means of cummuni-
cation over different types of channels. As Sebeok (p. 50) says, nThese 
channels are made up of a number of different bands over which messages 
can move synchronously. There is a vocal-auditory band which couples 
movement of vocal muscles with stimulation of auditory receptors. There is 
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also a gestural-visual. band ••• and a manipulational-situational band 
which, by t~e meditation of 'things' manipulated and observed, couples 
source and destination. 11 Each form of communication has its own code, 
the minimal units of which are emic units. What Sebeck means by the 
manipulational-situational band 11 is not entirely clear, although I would 
interpret it as involving such things as, for example, communicating your 
attitude toward someone by "sanipulating11 peoplEt by giving a party for 
the friend. Another example would be to write a letter to a person and 
communicate not only by the actual written message itself, but also by 
the type of sta~ionery used - high quality paper indicating deference or 
notebook paper indicating equality or friendship. The work of Birdwhistell 
on kinesics, Hall on proxemics, Trager on paralinguistics and Frank on 
tactile communication are all examples of attempts to define the emic 
units of the various channels and codes of human connnunication. 
The accompanying paradigm (Figure 4) is an initial attempt to organize 
the types of channels available for human communication into a coherent 
picture for examination. Those items included have been studied in varying 
degrees by a number of authors who do not necessarily see them in the 
terms proposed here. Most of the items are self-explanatory, but some 
such as the chemical channel have received little treatment in the 
research on human communication. The paradigm is merely suggestive and 
can be completed in greater detail and accuracy as further research in 
these types of areas continues. 
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It should be noted that quite frequently when there are problems in contact 
situations, these problems arise from the assumption that the culture being 
contacted shares the same code on a given band that the contacting culture 
has. Thus, Americans in administrative positions within Latin American 
cultures frequently become angered or aggravated by the fact that the people 
they are working w!th are late to appointments; the American often encodes 
lateness as a device for establishing social superiority and assumes that 
this is the way the other culture encodes it. The excellent work done by 
E.T. Hall and Arensberg and Niehoff, when viewed in terms of confusion 
between codes, takes on additional significance. The section which follows 
will elaborate upon this problem of isomorphism, or the lack of isomor-
phism, between codes both at a cross-cultural and an individual level. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS THEORY CROSS-CULTURALLY 
It has been a recoghlZed fact in linguistics and anthropology ror at 
least half a century now that referential categories a're not universals, 
but take varied forms in different languages (cf. de Saussure:116). The 
problems being encountered in machine translation give ample eviBence 
to this fact. In discussing this, Nida (1964:53) and Campbell and Hepler 
(1965:89) note that at the Individual level no two people use exactly 
the same symbols for the same types of experience (they do not have 
identical backgrounds and, therefore, differ in tltelr use of the same 
code) so that absolute communication is impossible. Pike (1954) recog-
nized this to be true of all aspects of behavior both at the individual 
level and at the cross-cultural level and, consequently, posited the 
etic-emic distinction for behavior. In short, etic phenomena are valid 
cross-culturally, universally predictable, but emic phenomena mus~ be 
discovered in each culture - they have structure imputed to them by their 
users. In psychology, the difference between sensation and cognition 
is somewhat akin to the etic-emic distinction (cf. Witkin, et al, 1954 
and Bruner, ~ al, 1966). Etic phenomena are those which are received 
by a person simply through senaation; emic phenomena involve the meaning-
ful categories into which the etic phenomena are placed by a member of 
a given culture. Etic phenomena are the areal world" but emic phenomena 
are .man's "created world". The process of 'euticizing' etic phenomena 
may later influence an individual's perception of phenomena. That is, 
in categorizing into a sinsle phenomenon what might be discrete phenomena, 
a person eventually comes to perceive the varied etic phenC>lJlet\a as a 
single phenomenon. He is unable to recognize that his single emic category 
3 
may have a number of actually discrete phenomena. 
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Out of this type of view the approach known as "ethnoscience" or 
11fnrmaJ semantics" came into being. The general purpose of ethno-
science is to discover the cognitive organization shared by individuals 
in a given culture - to discover the culturally-dete~ined ways in which 
individuals define and categorize experience. Various methodologtes are 
b•tng used to discover these underlying emic slassifications of phenomena, 
the most popular of which is componential analysis, developed from 
linguistic distinctive feature analysis by Goodenough (1961). 
Although not generally identified with ethnoscience approach, the 
semantic differential as developed by Osgood (1962) is also an attempt 
to determine cognitive organization in various cultures. 
What is the relevance of all of this to communication in the contact 
situation? Foster (1962:134) notes, as do many £~thors, that to the 
extent that language and culture are tha same for two individuals, com-
munication is relatively easy. But the more diversity that exists in 
either of these categories, the more difficulty there is in communicating. 
The raason for this, of course, is that when the source and the receiver 
are utilizing the same code in interpreting messages, there is little 
change in the meaning of the message. However, as the codes become 
increasingly diverse, the ability for both to interpret messages similarly 
decreases. 
Goodenough (1963;147) defines cognitive organization as including 
"the ways in which the phenomena we discern appear to us to be mutually 
associated or arranged, and it includes the transformations from one 
to another perceptual category that phenomena appear to undergo as 
their mutual associatiA>ns change." Individuals who share a common set 
of relations as well as signs are said to have cognitive symJDetry. or 
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co-orientation (Newcomb, 1953:69). The implications of this for culture 
change are twofold. First, for anyone to invent anything new or to 
accept a nel~ invention, he must organize existing concepts of reality into 
new relationships (Hagen, 1962:87; Goodenough, 1963:149). Second, since 
all change must be somewhat consistent with existing cognitive orientations, 
introduced ideas or traits will be perceived and interpreted in light of 
existing meaning patterns. This, of course, gives rise to the phenomenon 
of syncretism. Foster (1962:27) notes that the more susceptible a given 
innovation is to reinterpretation in terms of the existing conceptual 
framework, the more likely it is to be accepted. Consequently, if syncre-
tism is not desired, the new technique ~r idea must be presented in a way 
that the recipient penceives its potential advantages in much the same 
way as the innovator does (Foster:120). 
It is at this point that ethnoscience might be of some value, because 
it deals with the implicit associations surrounding ideas, and it is 
only if the change agent is aware of the connotations and associated 
values of a given idea that he can expect to predict possible reactions 
4 
to its introduction. By doing a detailed and complete analysis of the 
taxonomies associated with the new trait, the agent should gain insight 
into the recipient's code the way the recipient uses it, thus avoiding 
the fatal mistake of using his own perceptual grid to filter the concepts 
of the recipient. 
THE GEHERAL SYSTm•lS APPROACH 
At this point I would like to use the general systems approach to 
the contact situation. The model to be followed is the ~asic mo<J.,el pre-
sented by Shannon and Weaver described above. The basic intePp:te·cations 
are fairly obvious. The source, of course, 111ay be either of the cwo 
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cultures in contact, but I will refer to the source here as the contacting 
society, and to the destination as the contacted society since that generally 
seems to be the case today. The message to be transmitted deals with the 
introduction of an innovation, either ideological or technological. In 
most cases the transmitter is a professional agent, such as an agrono-
mist, who is a member of the contacting society and must first decode 
the message from his own coding system and then encode it into the coding 
system of the recipient culture. In so doing he is bound to introduce 
11semantic noise", which Weav.er defines as any distortion of meamng unin-
tentionally introduced by the source (1949:23). Since the agent is 
functioning as transmitter, converting a message into a code that he 
is not entirely familiar with, he will undoubtedly transmit some signals 
whose meaning is a little different than what he perceives it to be. 
Another type of semantic noise that might conceivably be introduced 
is the sending of conflicting messages over different channels (eg. saying 
one thing and unconsciously contnadicting it with behavior that means 
something else or indicates that he is not serious - that is. by contra-
dicting himself on a paralinguistic or kinesic channel). Similar to 
this problem is the problem of what many communications theorists refer 
to as csurface meaning11 and latent meaning" (Schramm, 1963:9). The 
surface meaning of a message is that meaning taken directly from a 
spoken utterance whereas latent meaning is that meaning abstracted from 
the context of the relationship of sender and receiveT. For example, 
to say ''Good morning' does not necessarily mean that the weather is 
good. To interpret it this way is to utilize only surface meaning, but 
to interpret it as meaning "Hello 01 Glad to see you is to utU.ize 
latent meaning. Frozen collocations, or idioms, are actually examples 
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Closely related is the matter of primary chanttel. It is often t'tue 
that the choice of channels is an important factor in making a message 
effective (Berlo, 1960:31). Therefore, the change agent must ask him-
self a number of questions such as: Which channel ordinarily takes pre-
cedence? Under what circumstances does this change? Would utilizing a 
"lesser'; channel by emphasizing it in some way make the message more or 
less acceptable? What combinations of bands are effective? Are there 
any serious taboos on some bands? The change agent would do well to list 
the possible channels as suggested by the paradigm in Figure 4 and to 
check each of these for possible effectiveness or for hindrances that they 
might incur. the relevance of each cell in the paradigm is goinP, to vary 
greatly depending upon the two cultures involved and upon immediate 
circumstances. In some cases, certain cells may be untestable, but 
nonetheless valuable in suggesting questions to be answered. For example, 
is a declarative mode of sentence more acceptable and likely to produce 
results than an imperative mode in a specific instance? Would a kinesic 
action in a desiderati~e mode (desiderative meaning 11desiren br I would 
like such and such to occur") made sil'l\lltaneously with an imperative 
li11guiatic statement have the same effect of indicating humor as dbes in 
our own eulture? (eg. ''Do it now and I don't mean maybe! - Please?') 
What kind of message does body odor or the use of perfumes and deodorants 
convey - deference? equality? superiority? Does this contradict the linguistic 
message being focused upon by the change agent? Does it "declare" that the 
spealaer is better or does it fit the desiderative mode indicating, for 
example, •1I'm wearing perfume (or not wearing it) because t want to plead 
with you to do such-and-such"? 
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It would be helpful to go through the entire matrix noting whether each 
cell represents the attitude of deference, equality or superiority. Although 
this cannot be applied to all cells, it should be helpful in giving insights 
in those to which it can be applied. 
When the responses of the contacted society are not what were expected 
in a given situation, the agent will utilize this negative feedback and com-
pensate in future transmissions. The longer the contact and the more feed-
back the agent gets, the more information he receives regarding the receiver's 
conception of the innovation. A classic case of the utilization of feedback 
in a change program is the Vicos project described by Holmberg (1960). 
Niehoff (1966) recognizes the importance of both watching for and utilizing 
feedback in directed change. 
In some situations of mediated contact the transmitter to the contacted 
society is a member of that society. Consequently, he will interpret the 
contact situation iu te~s of his own cognitive structurine and then transmit 
this version on to the recipient culture. If he has received his concept of 
the situation from a member of the CQntacting society rather than through 
direct experience, the original 1ouree message has the chance of being altered 
twice. In addition, he may choose ta ignore certain features or to transmit 
only part Qf what he ha$ received. A special problem arises when the receiver 
himself introduces semantic noise (eg. the mediator may be psychologically 
aaerrant, ~:rill decode messages in unusual ways and then transmit these). 
A model devised by Westley and Maclean (1957:83) to account for mediation 
1$ quite applicable here in that Lt s1,111111la~izes the possible relationshj.ps 












Revised slightly from Westley and MacLean, p. 83. 
In this model objects of o~ientation (x ••••• x) in the sensory field 
1 n 
of the receiver A are transmitted directly to him tn abstracted form 
120. 
(Tlis is a matter of an individual emicizing empirical phenomena as 
discussed earlier). A th~n encodes information regarding these objects 
of orientation (i.e. - referents, or the totality of objects and event6 
::out there") and sends a.messase to C regarding the referents. C must 
decode this information fo.r himself and then enoode it again t:o pass 
it on to B. In the process; the x1 ••.••• xh can take on a diff•ent form 
(x') first imputed by the emicizing process of A and taea take on a 
third form (x11 ) imputed by C's emicizing process. B' s~perception o-f 
x" may even be colored by the em.ic categories he ~as so th~ tbe original 
x1 ••••• xn has taken on a very different qµality by iae tiae B decodes 
it. C may abstract infermation directly f~gm his own sen~ory field 
(x3~), bypassing A and eliminate one of the possible qourees of dis-
tortion. Likewise B may get the information fi11sthand himself (x415). 
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Feedback (dotted lines) moves not only from B to C and B ·to A. but 
also from C to A. In westley and UacLean' s view, A,. B or C may be 
individuals, primary groups or total social systems, so the model becomes 
unlimited in its application (p. 84). They suggest in passing that the 
model might be applied to an intercultural situation (p. 87). If such is 
the case a number of interpretations might be open. C might be an 
individual mediating contact (a member of either cultural group in contact) 
or it might be a committee or agency such as a health clinic. A could 
be an entire social system (as when two small groups come into contact 
in a migration), or it too could be an agr;ncy interpreting a contacting 
culture's content to the contacced culture. 
Westley and MacLean are also the only ones encountered in the research 
for this paper who include non-puq,osive (non-directed) change along with 
purposive change in their -communications model. As they put it "A purpose 
message is one A originates for the purpose of modifying B's perception 
of an x. A non-pur-posive merssage is one which is transmitted to B directly 
or by means of a C and in the absence of any communicator's intent to 
influence him. The absence of a Communicator's intent to influence B 
transforms his act into an x. When a person says something he hopes will 
reach anoth~ person's ears, he is an A; but if he says it without such 
intent and it nevertheless is trans1111tted to B, his act must be conceived 
of as an x.'' tp. 84). This may be directly translated into a cross-ctt1-
tu~al situation of non-<lir~cted ehange as proposed by Spicer (19:S20ff.). 
In all contact situa~iona the nature of the contact as it is perceived 
by the !ndivid~al may be a source of noise. Knowing the cultural code of 
the receiver may not be -enough, for the cont-act itself may influence the 
message a~ per-cei'7ed by the receiver. Reference here is to a typology 
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of contact situations as proposed by such as Smith and Dohrenwend (1962) 
and Spicer (1961). Whether one believes his culture is in an inferior 
position or a superior position may be of extreme importance in conditioning 
attitudes toward a change agent, and, hence, in conditioning interpretation 
of messages. The relative peacefulness of the contact, the vigor of the 
contacting society in attempting directed change and th~ access that the 
contacted society has to positions in the contacting society can all play 
important i:ale.s in fonntng one's perception of both the message's content 
and ita intent~ 
The importance of elites or respected persons as mediators of innovation 
is recogni%ed by most change agents. In fact., one of the few studies 
concentrating specifically upon intercultural communication is a study 
of the role of elites as cultural brokers (E4eenstadt:510). Schramm 
(1963:10) has summed this up concisely when he says " ••• the impact of any 
message depeeds upon more than any one singleacbannel, actually on many 
channels or cues that we bear or see simultaneously. And with every message 
comes an especially imt,ortant cue - the knowledge of WHO said it, which 
helps us to determine whether to accept it and act on it." Some other 
principles established in communications research also seem to be taken 
as general principles operating in a contact situation. For example, 
the value of redundancy, so important in advertising, is recognized by 
Foster when he regards the continuing presence of the innovator as impor-
tant. The results of communications research by social psychologists 
should be of interest to those pursuing directed change. It could be of 
great value to know if the principles of recency vensus primacy, the use 
of contradictory propaganda in the presentation of an argument, or large 
scale exposure to ideas function in other cultures as they do in Western 
cultures. It may be that only when the universal characteristics of 
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persuasion and decision making are delineate~ can we expect to be successful 
predictors of the outcome of culture contact. 
FOOT1'110Tli:ti 
* Paper aelivered to t11e Rocky hountain Social Sciences Association, 196ti, 
.uenver, Colorado. 
l 
Tnis is auequately expressed in the stratificational theory of language 
espoused by Gleason and Laml.i among ot11ei:s. dere, the form-meaning 
composite is a morpheme and the underlying unit behind the morpheme 
is a seme1ae - an abstraction from the tangled mess of reality (see Gleason, 
1964:3). 
2 
For an earlier version of this type of mouel in linguistic terms, see 
Charles iiockett, A :danual of Phonology, pp.4-14. 
3 
Since it lies outside tile scope of tltL,s paper, the debate over the 
necessary correlation of perception and cognition will not Le discussea 
here. Also, the problem .of. wt1ether elid.cizi-ng involves learning dist·inc-
ions on a hign level of abstractiou or ,ihether it involves 'unlearning' 
already-perceived distinct-ions will be left to the psychologists ana 
linguists. I suspect taat botu 
4 
At this point :LIJ. its dei.V~l"opmenii, componential analysis will be of 
lil.ldteci help though, because as currently (1968) employed, it is restricted 
to signiftcation as o,pposeu to connotation. That is, it maps only the 
distinctive features of an iuea, not all possible associations. It also 
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